ABSTRACT: To deter financial misstatements, many companies have recently adopted compensation recovery policies-commonly known as ''clawbacks''-that authorize the board to recoup compensation paid to executives based on misstated financial reports. Clawbacks have been shown to reduce financial misstatements and increase investors' confidence on earnings information. We show that the benefits come with an unintended consequence of certain firms substituting for accruals management with real transactions management (e.g., reduce research and development [R&D] expenditures), especially firms with strong incentives to achieve short-term earnings targets, such as firms with high growth or high transient institutional ownership. As such, the total amount of earnings management does not decrease subsequent to clawback adoption. We further show that although real transactions management temporarily boosts those clawback adopters' short-term profitability and stock performance, this trend reverses after three years. In summary, clawbacks may have unexpected effects for a subset of firms whose managers are under greater pressure to meet earnings goals.
I. INTRODUCTION
O ne of the most notable recent changes in executive compensation practices has been an increase in the use of compensation recovery policies or ''clawbacks'' among public companies. Clawbacks are provisions that authorize the board of directors to recoup compensation paid to managers based on misstated financial reports. Among industrial firms covered in the Russell 3000, the number of firms that have adopted clawbacks increased from 19 to 444 over the 2005 to 2009 period. All listed firms will soon adopt clawback provisions, according to Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (U.S. House of Representatives 2010; hereafter, DFA 954). DFA 954 requires the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to direct stock exchanges to prohibit the listing of companies that have not implemented compensation clawback policies.
1 However, as of early 2014, the SEC had not finalized the new rules to implement DFA 954.
While listed companies do not need to implement DFA 954's mandatory clawback policies until the rule is finalized by the SEC, the effectiveness of this requirement is reflected in the increase in voluntary adoption of clawback provisions between 2005 and 2009. This issue has attracted a great deal of attention from academics and the business press. Extant research suggests that clawbacks voluntarily adopted by firms lead to a reduction in financial misstatements, which investors welcome, as indicated by higher earnings-response coefficients (ERCs) for adopting firms. External auditors also respond to clawback initiation by reducing effort when auditing clients with such provisions (Chan, K. Chen, T. Chen, and Yu 2012; DeHaan, Hodge, and Shevlin 2013) . Therefore, firm-initiated clawbacks appear to effectively deter financial misstatements.
A reduction in the occurrence of accounting restatements subsequent to clawback adoption, however, does not necessarily suggest an improvement in earnings quality. As Denis (2012) argues, decreased financial misstatements after clawback initiation may be driven by managers' reluctance to disclose restatements to avoid triggering clawbacks or by auditors' reduced effort to uncover accounting irregularities. As such, whether earnings manipulation does indeed decrease after clawback adoption remains an open question.
In this study, we examine whether clawbacks lead to a substitution between reduced accruals management and increased real transactions management. We predict that, on one hand, clawbacks deter managers from using accruals management because high accounting accruals tend to attract more scrutiny from the SEC and auditors. Hence, high accounting accruals are more likely to be associated with accounting restatements, which trigger clawbacks (Dechow, Ge, and Schrand 2010) . On the other hand, real transactions management, such as cutting back on R&D or SG&A (selling, general, and administrative) expenses, is considered less risky than accruals management. The reason is that real transactions management represents a deviation from optimal business practices taken by managers to achieve certain earnings targets, but is unlikely to be deemed 1 Regulatory clawbacks were first introduced by Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX; U.S. House of Representatives 2002) . Specifically, SOX 304 authorizes the SEC to recoup bonuses paid to CEOs and CFOs of public companies when the company restates its financial statements due to material noncompliance with any financial reporting requirement as a result of misconduct. However, the SEC rarely enforces SOX 304, probably due to the SEC's limited resources and difficulty in proving managerial misconduct. In response, DFA 954 designates the board of directors rather than the SEC as the enforcer of clawbacks.
in profitability that reverses later. This substitution is consistent with Cohen et al.'s (2008) findings, which show that firms switch from accruals manipulation to real transactions management after the passage of SOX. 2 Thus, our study implies that a mechanism designed to improve financial reporting quality may have unintended consequences for certain types of firms.
Next, Section II develops our testable hypotheses. Section III discusses the sample. Section IV presents our research design and reports the results, and Section V concludes.
II. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Firm-initiated clawbacks have become popular among public companies since 2005. For instance, 194 firms on the S&P 500 index had adopted clawbacks as of early 2011 (Addy and Yoder 2011) . While financial media raise questions about the effectiveness of firm-initiated clawbacks (e.g., Dvorak and Ng 2006; Weiss 2008; Lublin 2010) , Chan et al. (2012) and DeHaan et al. (2013) find that after clawback adoption, financial misstatements decrease and investors consider earnings to be more informative. Moreover, Chan et al. (2012) find that audit fees are lower after clawback provisions are adopted. Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2013) further find a significantly positive market reaction to clawback adoption announcements. Although the above findings are subject to alternative interpretations (Denis 2012) , firm-initiated clawbacks appear to deter financial misstatements and improve the integrity of financial reporting.
We expect clawback adoption to lead to a reduction in accruals manipulation. First, to avoid accounting restatements, managers of clawback adopters are expected to engage in earnings manipulation that is less likely to exceed the boundaries of GAAP and, hence, is less likely to be detected by regulators or auditors.
3 As Dechow et al. (2010, 349) argue, financial reports with high accruals tend to attract more scrutiny from the SEC and are more likely to trigger accounting restatements. Second, managers subject to clawback provisions enhance internal control systems to prevent potential misstatements (Chan et al. 2012) . As Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008) show, remediation of internal control deficiencies prevents managers from engaging in accruals manipulation, including misreporting warranty liabilities or the allowance for bad debt.
Clawback provisions, however, are unlikely to eliminate all types of earnings manipulation, particularly when managers are under pressure to meet or beat earnings targets. 4 Previous research shows that, in addition to accruals management, real transactions management, such as cutting back on R&D or SG&A expenditures, is another means to manage earnings. The use of real transactions represents a deviation from optimal operating decisions, but is not likely to be deemed improper by regulators or auditors (Roychowdhury 2006) . Thus, managers often resort to real transactions before turning to accruals to meet or beat earnings targets (Zang 2012) . In their survey of CFOs, Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) find that a majority of financial executives are willing to cut 2 Although Cohen et al. (2008) document a substitution between accruals management and real transactions management after the passage of SOX, it is not clear which section of SOX contributes to this effect. In particular, Sections 302 and 404, covering disclosure of internal control weakness, are both shown to improve accruals quality (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, and LaFond 2008) . Further, Section 304 introduces the first mandatory clawbacks, which may also affect managers' choice of earnings management tools. Because our study focuses on firm-initiated clawbacks, we are better able to draw conclusions on the effects of such provisions. 3 As indicated in Collins and McInnis (2011) , an earnings management tool is considered more costly if it has a higher probability of attracting regulatory scrutiny or shareholders' attention. 4 Meeting certain earnings benchmarks is important, because doing so increases the firm's credibility with the capital market, supports the firm's stock price, and promotes the management team's reputation (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Graham et al. 2005) . Missing an earnings benchmark, in contrast, creates uncertainty about the company's future and can lead executives to suffer personal financial penalties (Matsunaga and Park 2001) . In addition to capital market incentives, executive compensation is also tied to reported earnings, thereby providing incentives for managers to manipulate earnings. Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther (2010) provide a detailed literature review.
discretionary expenditures, such as R&D or advertising, to maintain accounting appearances, even if such actions would sacrifice the firm's long-term performance.
Using a rational expectation model, Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) demonstrate that a regulation intended to improve earnings quality may actually lead managers to use other manipulation tools, such as real transactions. The reason is that better earnings quality leads to higher value relevance in the form of a stronger association between reported earnings and stock price. In addition, better earnings quality can encourage compensation committees to put more weight on reported earnings in determining executive compensation. Thus, managers benefit more by increasing earnings using real transactions management. Consistent with this prediction, Cohen et al. (2008) show that after the passage of SOX, accruals management decreases while real transactions management increases. That is, when regulatory scrutiny or shareholder monitoring increases, managers tend to shift from accruals management to real transactions management. Accordingly, we predict that managers of clawback adopters increase the use of real transactions management subsequent to the adoption of clawbacks.
To summarize, we expect that clawback provisions cause managers to switch from accruals manipulation to real transactions management to achieve earnings targets. More formally:
H1: Subsequent to the adoption of clawback provisions, accruals-based earnings management decreases while real transactions management increases.
Clawback Adopters with High-versus Low-Growth Opportunities
H1 predicts that clawback provisions lead firms to substitute among different earnings management tools. We next predict that this phenomenon is more pronounced among clawback firms with high-growth opportunities. Skinner and Sloan (2002) show that compared to value firms, growth companies experience a sharper decline in share price after missing consensus forecasts. Further, extant literature on executive compensation shows that executives of firms with higher growth opportunities, such as firms with high market-to-book ratios, tend to receive more stock options or restricted stock than executives of firms with lower growth opportunities (Murphy 2003) . Taken together, this evidence suggests that relative to CEOs of value firms, managers of growth companies experience a larger financial loss if their firms fail to meet or beat earnings benchmarks and, hence, have stronger incentives to achieve earnings targets. Thus, we predict that among clawback adopters, those with greater growth opportunities are more likely to turn to real transactions management to meet or beat earnings targets. More formally:
H2: Among clawback adopters, those with high-growth opportunities are more likely to shift from accruals management to real transactions management subsequent to the adoption of clawback provisions.
Clawback Adopters with High versus Low Transient Institutional Ownership
We also expect that the shift from accruals management to real transactions management subsequent to clawback adoption occurs primarily in firms with high transient institutional ownership. Bushee (1998) argues that due to high portfolio turnover, transient institutional investors tend to place significant focus on short-term earnings targets, which incentivizes managers to cut R&D investments to avoid negative earnings surprises. Supporting this argument, Matsumoto (2002) To test our empirical hypotheses, we require clawback adopters and non-adopters to have the necessary data in Compustat, CRSP, Corporate Library, Risk Metrics, and Audit Analytics. These requirements reduce our primary sample to 343 firms with clawback provisions in place as of 2009 and 1,840 firms that do not have such provisions in place at any point during our sample period. Table 1 , Panel C compares salient firm characteristics across the 343 clawback adopters and 1,840 non-adopters. On average, clawback adopters have larger firm size, as measured by market value and sales revenue, lower sales growth, higher leverage ratio, more operating segments, better profitability, longer CEO tenure, higher CEO pay as a percentage of total pay of top five executives, and better corporate governance in terms of institutional ownership and board independence. Table 1 , Panel C indicates that clawback adopters differ from non-adopters along several dimensions, suggesting potential endogeneity associated with the decision to adopt clawbacks. Therefore, we employ propensity score matching (PSM) to control for observable differences between clawback adopters and non-adopters. Specifically, following Chan et al. (2012) and DeHaan et al. (2013) , we model clawback adoption as a function of firm size, as measured by market value and sales revenue, market-to-book ratio, sales growth, leverage, ROA, number of segments, restatement history, institutional ownership, board independence, CEO tenure, CEO pay, earnings-response coefficient, industry membership, and year fixed effects using a probit model.
Results of this analysis are reported in Table 1 , Panel D. Employing a firm-level regression analysis by using year 2006 data, we find that clawback adoption is positively associated with firm size, number of segments, restatement history, and board independence, and negatively related to sales growth, earnings-response coefficients, and CEO tenure, consistent with Babenko et al. (2012) and DeHaan et al. (2013) . 
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The Accounting Review January 2015 Next, for each clawback adopter, we choose the non-adopter with the closest propensity score as the control firm. Specifically, we use a one-to-one firm matching with a caliper of 0.1, and a common support range of [0.1 to 0.9] (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008) . This procedure yields 252 pairs of clawback adopters and control firms. One concern with a single round of PSM is that it may not control fully for observable differences across clawback adopters and non-adopters. Thus, as suggested in Peel and Makepeace (2009), we perform a double PSM; that is, we repeat the clawback selection model procedure described earlier on the 252 matched pairs. This second round of PSM further reduces the sample size to 236 pairs of clawback adopters and control firms, which we use as the primary sample for our empirical tests.
The two rounds of PSM apparently alleviate observable differences across clawback adopters and control firms, as shown in Table 1 , Panel E. Considering the same set of firm characteristics as in Panel C, clawback adopters, on average, are statistically indistinguishable from their matched control firms, indicating that our matching procedure achieves a covariate balance.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Following prior studies on firm-initiated clawbacks (Chan et al. 2012; DeHaan et al. 2013) , we use the difference-in-differences approach to test our hypotheses. Specifically, we employ the following research design: where Y is the dependent variable of interest, the value of discretionary accruals or measures of real transactions management. PostClawback is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the company is a clawback adopter in those years in which the clawback provision is implemented, and 0 otherwise. The coefficient on PostClawback measures the change in the dependent variable of interest across pre-and post-adoption periods for a clawback firm compared to the change over the same interval for a control firm. X is a vector of control variables; u and d denote firm-and year-specific fixed effects. The inclusion of firm fixed effects helps control for time-invariant differences across clawback adopters and control firms that may not be alleviated by PSM. Finally, standard errors are adjusted based on the Huber-White sandwich estimate of variances and are clustered by firm.
Accruals-Based Earnings Management
Following prior literature, we use performance-adjusted discretionary accruals to proxy for accruals management (Kothari, Leone, and Wasley 2005; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008 ). Specifically, we first estimate the following modified Jones (1991) model cross-sectionally for industry-years with at least 20 observations, using the entire Compustat universe:
where TA is earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations minus the operating cash flow reported in the statement of cash flows in year t (Collins and Hribar 2002) . Asset denotes total assets, and PPE is gross property, plant, and equipment. Following Kothari et al. (2005) , we subtract the change in accounts receivable from the change in sales revenue (DSales) prior to estimating Equation (2). 5 The estimated residuals from Equation (2) are unadjusted discretionary accruals. While we include an intercept in Equation (2) following Kothari et al. (2005) , we find that our results remain qualitatively similar if we exclude the intercept-that is, the sign and statistical significance levels of PostClawback are similar to those reported in Table  2 , Panel B. Finally, we follow Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008) to performance-adjust the discretionary accruals obtained from Equation (2). Specifically, we use the entire Compustat universe and rank firms within each industry into ten deciles based on the prior year's ROA, and compute the performance-adjusted discretionary accruals as the difference between the sample firm's discretionary accruals and the median discretionary accruals for firms in the same industry ROA decile, where the median ROA value excludes the particular sample firm. More importantly, given that we have identified 236 pairs of clawback adopters and control firms using the PSM procedure, we ensure that each individual firm within the 236 pairs of clawback adopters and non-adopters does not serve as each other's performance-adjustment for discretionary accruals. Kothari et al. (2005) indicate that subtracting the change in accounts receivable from the change in sales in the first stage helps to avoid overestimating discretionary accruals for firms with extreme growth. 6 For example, if we exclude the intercept from Equation (2) 
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Real Transactions Management
Following Roychowdhury (2006), we proxy for real transactions management using three measures, ABExp, ABProd, and ABCash, which represent abnormal levels of discretionary expenses (the sum of R&D, advertising, and SG&A expenses), production costs, and cash flow from operating activities, respectively. ABExp, ABProd, and ABCash are residuals from the following three regressions:
We estimate Equations (3) to (5) by year and two-digit SIC code for all firms in Compustat during our sample period (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) . 8 The estimated coefficients from the corresponding industry-years are used to compute firm-specific ABExp, ABProd, and ABCash. Roychowdhury (2006) posits that managers often cut discretionary expenses, such as advertising or R&D expenses, to boost shortterm earnings, suggesting a negative ABExp. Moreover, a positive ABProd suggests that managers overproduce inventory items to reduce costs of goods sold per unit in order to achieve a higher reported operating income. Finally, to inflate sales revenue, managers are likely to offer price discounts or lenient credit terms, although these practices may lead to lower operating cash flow, a negative ABCash. Following Cohen and Zarowin (2010), we also create two overall measures of real transactions management by summing ABCash and ABExp (RTM1), and ABProd and ABExp (RTM2), respectively. Specifically, we multiply ABExp and ABCash by À1 so that they can represent real transactions management in a consistent fashion as ABProd; i.e., companies with greater real transactions management are expected to have a positive ABProd, but a negative ABExp and ABCash.
The Impact of Clawbacks on Accruals Management
To examine whether firms that adopt clawback provisions decrease accruals management and increase real transactions manipulation (H1), we estimate the following regression models, which follow Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008), Cohen and Zarowin (2010) , and Zang (2012):
AM is the value of performance-adjusted accruals, as described earlier. RTM is one of three measures, ABExp, ABCash, and ABProd, as defined above. PostClawback is defined as in Equation (1). Size is the natural log of total assets, M/B is the market-to-book ratio, and SaleG is one-year sales growth. ROA is income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets. Following Zang (2012), we include ZScore, MktShare, MTax, and Inst% to control for the costs associated with real transactions management: ZScore is the decile of Altman's Z-score, MktShare is the Herfindahl index using two-digit SIC-codes, MTax is the marginal tax rate, and Inst% is the percentage of institutional ownership. Zang (2012) shows that firms with better financial health (higher ZScore) and larger market share (MktShare) are more likely to engage in real transactions management. In contrast, higher marginal tax rates (MTax) and institutional ownership (Inst%) constrain the use of real transactions management. Next, we include BigFour, AuditTenure, NOA, and Cycle to proxy for the costs related to accruals manipulation. BigFour is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is audited by one of the Big 4 CPA firms, and 0 otherwise. AuditTenure is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of years the auditor has audited the client is above the sample median, and 0 otherwise. Cycle is days receivable plus days inventory less days payable. NOA is a dummy variable equal to 1 if net operating assets, measured as shareholders' equity less cash and marketable securities plus total debt, at the beginning of the year divided by lagged sales is above the median of the corresponding industry-year, and 0 otherwise. We expect that managers are less likely to use accruals manipulation when they face stronger scrutiny by external auditors, suggesting that Big 4 auditors (BigFour) and auditor tenure (AuditTenure) are negatively related to accruals management.
The use of accruals management in the current year is expected to be constrained by prior years' accruals manipulation, suggesting a negative association between NOA and the amount of accruals management (Barton and Simko 2002) . Firms with a longer operating cycle are expected to have more flexibility in using accruals management, suggesting a positive relation between Cycle and AM. M&A is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is pursuing a merger or acquisition, and 0 otherwise. Restructure is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company has undergone restructuring activities, and 0 otherwise. Writeoff is equal to 1 if the company reports any asset write-down in the year, and 0 otherwise.
Finally, following prior studies that document a substitution between real transactions management and accruals manipulation (e.g., Cohen et al. 2008) , we include AM (RTM) as a control variable when the dependent variable is RTM (AM). u i and d t are firm and year fixed effects, respectively. This regression is based on 3,556 firm-year observations for 236 pairs of clawback adopters and non-adopters over the 2000 to 2009 period. The coefficient on PostClawback measures the change in the levels of discretionary accruals and real transactions management for a firm before and after clawback adoption and compares this change with that for a control firm over the same period.
The results of Equation (6) are presented in Table 2 . Panel A presents descriptive statistics for key variables used to test Equation (6). We find that relative to pre-adoption periods, clawback adopters have a similar amount of signed discretionary accruals (AM), but they have a lower amount of positive discretionary accruals (AM . 0), as well as negative discretionary accruals (AM , 0) subsequent to having clawbacks. As such, the absolute amount of discretionary accruals (jAMj) is significantly lower during post-adoption periods for clawback adopters. In contrast, control firms do not exhibit any significant change in discretionary accruals during the same periods. For real transactions management, we find that relative to pre-adoption periods, clawback adopters, on average, have lower discretionary expenses and lower cash flow operating activities during post-adoption periods, suggesting that they have greater real transactions management subsequent to having clawbacks. In contrast, we do not observe any significant change in RTM proxies for control firms except for ABCash.
Next, turning to the regression results in Table 2 , Panel B, we find that in the first column, where the dependent variable is signed accruals, the coefficient on PostClawback is statistically insignificant (À0.002, p ¼ 0.757). We next estimate Equation (6) separately for firms with positive and negative accruals; that is, we partition the 3,556 firm-year observations into two groups based on the sign of discretionary accruals. The results of this analysis are provided in the second and third columns. The coefficient on PostClawback is negatively significant in the second column (À0.020, p ¼ 0.019), whereas it is positive but insignificant in the third column (0.007, p ¼ 0.332).
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The results indicate that clawback provisions constrain income-increasing accruals, but not downward accruals manipulation.
Next, we present the results of real transactions management in columns (4) to (8). In column (4), where ABExp is the dependent variable, we find that the coefficient on PostClawback is significantly negative (À0.024, p ¼ 0.023), suggesting that adopting firms reduce discretionary expenses after clawback adoption. In column (5), where the dependent variable is ABCash, we find that the coefficient on PostClawback is significantly negative (À0.014, p ¼ 0.025), indicating that clawback adopters are associated with abnormally low operating cash flow. Turning to the sixth column, which presents results using ABProd as the dependent variable, we find that the coefficient on PostClawback is insignificant, which indicates that clawback adopters do not engage in abnormal production after adopting clawbacks. We also consider the two overall measures of RTM: RTM1, the sum of ABCash and ABExp, and RTM2, the sum of ABProd and ABExp, as the dependent variable. As stated earlier, we multiply ABExp and ABCash by À1 to ensure that the three variables represent real management in a consistent fashion (the more positive the number is, the higher the real manipulation). The results in columns (7) and (8) confirm that clawback adopters engage in more real transactions manipulation in the post-adoption period, as the coefficient on PostClawback is significantly positive in both columns. The control variables, whenever significant, take the predicted signs.
To summarize, the results in Table 2 , Panel B indicate that the passage of clawback provisions leads to reduced accruals manipulation, but greater real transactions management. Given the two opposite effects, we next analyze how clawbacks affect the overall level of earnings management. To do so, we sum the signed accruals (AM) and the aggregate real transactions management (RTM1 or RTM2) to construct EM, the overall level of earnings management. Because we obtain very similar results using either RTM1 or RTM2, we present only the result based on RTM1 to save space (column (9)). We find that the coefficient on PostClawback is significantly positive (0.026, p ¼ 0.064), indicating that the increase in real transactions management dominates the reduction in accruals manipulation, thereby leading to a marginal increase in the total amount of earnings management subsequent to clawback initiation.
Before moving to the next test, following Armstrong, Jagolinzer, and Larcker (2010), we examine whether our findings in Table 2 , Panel B are robust to hidden bias associated with clawback adoption. Specifically, we conduct the boundary test, as outlined by Rosenbaum (2002) , to ensure that our inference is not sensitive to hidden bias that may not be eliminated by PSM. To do so, we first compute the percentage of clawback adopters and control firms with a shift from accruals management to real transactions management. We find that 58 percent of the 236 clawback adopters experience a substitution between accruals and real transactions management, whereas only 30 percent of control firms exhibit such a phenomenon, and the difference is statistically significant (p ¼ 0.008). Next, we estimate the boundary C value, which represents the amount of hidden bias necessary to invalidate the above inference. According to Rosenbaum (2002) , a larger C 9 We also consider the absolute value of discretionary accruals (jAMj) and add volatility of operating cash flow and volatility of sales revenue to Equation (6) when doing so, as suggested by Hribar and Nichols (2007) . We find that the coefficient on PostClawback is significantly negative (À0.015, p ¼ 0.017), indicating that the amount of unsigned discretionary accruals is lower subsequent to the adoption of clawback provisions. Moreover, we also verify our findings using another accrual measure following Dechow and Dichev (2002) . We find that our conclusions are unaffected by using this method to calculate accruals. Untabulated results indicate that the coefficient on PostClawback is À0.018 (p ¼ 0.015), suggesting that clawback adoption improves accruals quality.
value provides greater confidence that the results are not sensitive to hidden bias. The C value is 4.64 for our sample, which provides strong support for our finding that clawback provisions cause managers to substitute accruals management with real transactions management.
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Next, we add control variables related to executive compensation and reestimate Equation (6) because earnings manipulation activities are affected by incentives stemming from option grants or managers' stock holdings (Cheng and Warfield 2005; Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson 2007) . Specifically, following Cheng and Warfield (2005) and Cohen et al. (2008) , we include the variables Bonus, Option_Grant, Option_Ex, Option_Un, and Owner. Bonus is CEO annual bonus compensation as a proportion of total compensation. Option_Grant is the number of options granted to the CEO during the year divided by the firm's total common shares outstanding. Option_Ex is the number of exercisable options held by the CEO at year-end divided by the firm's total common shares outstanding. Option_Un is the number of unexercisable options (excluding annual option grants) held by the CEO at year-end divided by the firm's total common shares outstanding. Owner is shares owned by the CEO divided by the firm's total common shares outstanding.
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 2 , Panel C. In short, the results are similar to those reported in Panel B. In particular, clawback initiation leads to a reduction in the use of positive discretionary accruals, while it increases reliance on real transactions management. Turning to the control variables, consistent with Cohen et al. (2008) , we find that annual option grants to the CEO, the number of unexercisable options held by the CEO, and CEO stock ownership are positively related to the use of accruals management.
11 In contrast, we find that bonus as a proportion of total pay and unexercisable options are related to a lower level of real transactions management.
To summarize, the results in Table 2 support H1, which posits that clawback adoption leads to less accruals management, but greater real transactions management.
A Two-Stage Model to Account for the Endogenous Decision to Manage Earnings
The results in Table 2 indicate that clawback adoption leads to a trade-off between accruals manipulation and real transactions management. Firms' decision to engage in earnings manipulation, however, is not exogenous. Moreover, as argued in Watts and Zimmerman (1986) , except when used for opportunistic purposes, earnings management may also be efficient. 10 We also perform the Heckman test to check the robustness of our findings, as suggested by Tucker (2010) .
Specifically, we again estimate the clawback adoption model described in Section III using a firm-year-level regression analysis. To satisfy the ''excluding restriction'' as indicated in Lennox, Francis, and Wang (2012) , however, we add two instrumental variables, Enforceability and PeerAdopt, to the model. Enforceability is a statelevel enforcement index of non-competition clauses included in employment contracts, which is obtained from Garmaise (2011) . PeerAdopt is defined as the percentage of peer firms in the same industry (two-digit SIC codes) that also have clawback provisions in place. The two instruments, Enforceability and PeerAdopt, are not expected to be directly associated with the second-stage dependent variables AM and RTM. Untabulated results indicate that our main findings remain generally unchanged. Specifically, we find that clawback adoption is related to less accruals manipulation, but greater real transactions management. Importantly, the sign and statistical significances on PostClawback are similar to those reported in Table 2 , Panel B. For example, the coefficient on PostClawback is À0.026 (p ¼ 0.000) when the dependent variable is positive discretionary accruals (AM . 0). We find that the variance inflation factor (VIF) associated with the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) and PostClawback is 1.95, suggesting that multicollinearity is very low in this specification. 11 Another reason to control for compensation variables in the analysis of earnings management is that the initiation of clawback provisions may be accompanied by changes in executive compensation practices. Indeed, prior studies find that regulations that affect financial reporting practices tend to also change executive compensation practices. Carter, Lynch, and Zechman (2009) and Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2013) , for example, find that the passage of SOX reduces accruals manipulation, and the reduced earnings manipulation allows firms to put more weight on accounting earnings in the determination of the CEO's annual bonus.
For example, managers may use discretionary accruals to convey information about company prospects (Subramanyam 1996) . As such, to verify whether the substitution between accruals manipulation and real transactions management subsequent to clawbacks does indeed represent opportunistic behavior, we use the Heckman model to address the self-selection associated with earnings manipulation decisions. Specifically, following Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Zang (2012) , we first model a company's decision to manage reported earnings as the following probit model:
where Clawback is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is a clawback adopter, and 0 otherwise. Suspect_EM is a dummy variable equal to 1 if either AM or RTM is above the industryyear median, and 0 otherwise (Cohen and Zarowin 2010) . Based on this definition, 2,227 firm-years among the full sample can be classified as suspect firm-years.
Leverage is long-term liabilities divided by total assets. Size, M/B, and ROA are as previously defined. We include these variables to control for the effects of capital structure, profitability, firm size, and growth opportunities on earnings management (Dechow et al. 2010) . HabitBeater is the number of times analysts' forecast consensus had been met or beaten over the past four quarters. Shares is the log of the number of shares outstanding. As posited by Cohen and Zarowin (2010) , HabitBeater and Shares capture capital market incentives for managers to engage in more earnings management to meet earnings targets, suggesting a positive sign on the two variables. NAnalyst, the number of analysts following the firm at the beginning of the year, involves two offsetting effects. Being followed by more analysts could provide stronger incentives for managers to manage earnings, but financial analysts with sophisticated financial and industry knowledge could also constrain managers' earnings management activities. In short, there is no predicted sign on NAnalyst.
The results of Equation (7) are presented in Table 3 , Panel A. We find that the coefficient on Clawback is statistically insignificant, suggesting that clawback adopters do not differ from control firms in their propensity to meet or just beat earnings benchmarks. Consistent with Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Zang (2012) , we find that the likelihood of engaging in earnings manipulation to achieve earnings targets is positively related to firm size, leverage, a prior history of meeting or beating earnings benchmarks, and the number of shares outstanding, and it is negatively related to number of analysts following the firm.
After estimating Equation (7), we compute the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) and include it to reestimate Equation (6) using the 2,227 suspect firm-years. The results are presented in Table  3 , Panel B. To save space, we present only the coefficients on PostClawback and IMR. In general, the results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 2 . In particular, using a sample of firm-years suspected of earnings manipulation, we find that clawback adopters reduce accruals manipulation while increasing real transactions management subsequent to clawback initiation.
Subgroup Analysis
H2 predicts that clawback firms with high-growth opportunities are more likely to resort to real activities management to meet or beat earnings targets relative to clawback adopters with lowgrowth opportunities. To test this conjecture, we partition the 236 pairs of clawback adopters and non-adopters into two groups based on the median market-to-book ratio. That is, a company is considered as having high-growth opportunities if its average market-to-book ratio over the entire sample period is above the sample median; otherwise, we classify it as a firm with low-growth opportunities. We then estimate Equation (6) separately for clawback adopters and non-adopters with high-growth opportunities and those with low-growth opportunities. In doing so, we compare treatment firms (clawback adopters) and control firms (non-adopters) on the same grounds. The results of this analysis are provided in Table 4 , Panel A, again presenting results only for the variables of interest. See Appendix A for variable definitions.
We find that our results are driven mainly by clawback adopters with high-growth opportunities. Specifically, we find that the coefficient on PostClawback is significant in columns (3), (7), and (9), suggesting that clawback adopters with high-growth opportunities engage in less positive accruals management, while they switch to real activities management to a greater extent after initiating clawbacks. As such, the total amount of earnings management actually increases after clawback adoption for adopters with high-growth opportunities. In contrast, we do not observe the same phenomenon for clawback firms with low-growth opportunities. Further tests reveal that these differences between the two groups are statistically significant, on average.
H3 predicts that clawback firms with high transient institutional ownership are more likely to switch to real activities management to meet or beat earnings targets relative to clawback adopters with low transient institutional ownership. We again partition the 236 pairs of clawback adopters and non-adopters into two groups based on the median level of transient institutional ownership. We then estimate Equation (6) separately for clawback adopters and non-adopters with high transient institutional ownership and those with low transient institutional ownership. The results of this analysis are provided in Table 4 , Panel B.
We find that our results are driven mainly by clawback adopters with high transient institutional ownership. Specifically, we find that the coefficient on PostClawback is significant in columns (3), (7), and (9), suggesting that clawback adopters with high transient institutional ownership engage in less positive accruals management, while they switch to real activities management to a greater extent after initiating clawbacks. As such, the total amount of earnings management actually increases after clawback adoption for adopters with transient institutional ownership. In contrast, we do not observe the same phenomenon for clawback firms with low transient institutional ownership, and the differences between the two groups are statistically significant.
The Impact of Clawbacks on Firm Performance
The results in Tables 2 to 4 suggest that clawback adoption causes a shift from accruals manipulation to real transactions management. We next analyze whether this shift represents an unintended consequence in terms of increased costs for those adopting firms. It is possible that the increase in real transactions management actually represents an efficient outcome. For example, shareholders expect managers to make such a shift when a clawback provision is instituted or to convey information about the company's future prospects (Gunny 2010) . If this argument holds, then we should not observe any negative consequence subsequent to clawback initiation.
Alternatively, the increase in real transactions management may create adverse consequences for clawback adopters, while temporarily boosting short-term performance (Gupta, Pevzner, and Seethamraju 2010; Cohen and Zarowin 2010) . In particular, Bhojraj et al. (2009) find that although using discretionary accruals or real transactions management to achieve short-term earnings targets may lead to positive short-term stock returns, this trend reverses over a three-year horizon.
Based on the above discussion, we investigate whether clawback adopters that engage in greater real transactions management have better performance in the year of increasing RTM and then experience underperformance subsequent to clawback adoption. We estimate the following model, following Cohen and Zarowin (2010) : 
where DROA (tÀ1, t) ; (t, tþi ) is (1) the industry-adjusted change in ROA from year tÀ1 to t, and (2) the industry-adjusted change in ROA from year t to tþi; i ¼ 1, 2, and 3. Year t is the year during which the clawback provision is initiated. DSize is the change in Size, DM/B is the change in M/B, and DLeverage is the change in Leverage. Size, M/B, Leverage, and ROA are as previously defined. d t is year-specific fixed effects. Clawback_IRTM (Clawback_DRTM) equals 1 if the clawback adopter increases (decreases) its amount of real transactions management during the adoption year relative to pre-adoption years, and 0 otherwise. That is, a clawback adopter is considered as increasing its use of real transactions management (as measured by RTM1, which is the sum of ABCash and ABExp, or RTM2, which is the sum of ABProd and ABExp) if its amount of real transactions management in year t is larger than in the pre-adoption period; otherwise, we consider the clawback adopter as decreasing its use of real transactions management. Using this definition enables us to investigate how increased real transactions management affects current performance and future performance in one to three years. The results are reported in Table 5 . (As our results are very similar using either RTM1 or RTM2 to define Clawback_IRTM and Clawback_DRTM, we present only the results based on RTM1 to save space.)
The coefficient on Clawback_IRTM is significantly positive in the first column of Table 5 , suggesting that clawback adopters engaging in more RTM experience a larger increase in accounting performance in the year, relative to control firms and adopters without increasing RTM. However, we also find that the coefficient on Clawback_IRTM is significantly negative in columns (3) and (4), suggesting that clawback adopters that increase real transactions management experience a larger decrease in ROA in years tþ2 and tþ3. Interestingly, we notice that the absolute magnitude of the coefficient on Clawback_IRTM in columns (2) to (4) is similar to that in column (1). This suggests that clawback adopters that engage in more RTM are able to temporarily boost their accounting profitability in year t, but this spike does not sustain in later years.
In contrast, the coefficient on Clawback_DRTM is insignificant in all columns, suggesting that relative to control firms and adopters with increased RTM, clawback adopters that decrease real transactions management do not experience significant changes in firm performance after adopting clawbacks. Further tests reveal that the differences in changes in ROA between the two coefficients (Clawback_IRTM versus Clawback_DRTM) are statistically significant in all years except for year tþ1.
Except for ROA, we also estimate Equation (8) using annual abnormal stock returns (ARET) as the dependent variable, and we again compute ARET for the five-year period from year tÀ1 to tþ3. The results of this analysis are provided in columns (5) to (8). We find that the coefficient on Clawback_IRTM is significantly positive in the fifth column, suggesting that relative to control firms and adopters without increasing RTM, clawback adopters that increase RTM in the adoption year have better stock returns in year t. The coefficient on Clawback_IRTM is not statistically significant in columns (6) and (7) and is significantly negative in the eighth column. This again suggests that clawback adopters that increase RTM experience a short-term spike in stock returns in year t, but this reverses after three years. To summarize, the results in Table 5 are consistent with the notion that clawback adoption causes managers to engage in suboptimal operating activities to boost short-term performance at the expense of long-term value.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this study, we examine whether firm-initiated clawback provisions, policies that aim to reduce financial misstatements by allowing firms to recoup compensation from managers in the event of accounting restatements, influence managers' choice between accruals management and real transactions management to meet or beat earnings targets. Using Russell 3000 nonfinancial firms to form a matched sample of clawback adopters and non-adopters, we first show that clawback adoption leads to less accruals management, but greater real transactions management. Specifically, we find that relative to pre-adoption periods and to firms without clawbacks, clawback adopters are associated with lower positive discretionary accruals (but not downward accruals) and are more likely to cut back on discretionary expenses, such as R&D or SG&A, or manipulate sales revenue, as reflected in abnormally low cash flow from operating activities. Moreover, this phenomenon occurs mainly among clawback adopters with greater growth opportunities or higher levels of transient institutional ownership. Finally, we find that clawback adopters that engage in greater real transactions management exhibit better stock and operating performance in the concurrent year, and this trend reverses after three years. This finding is consistent with the notion that real activities management boosts short-term profits, but sacrifices long-term firm value. Taken together, our results indicate that although clawbacks deter managers from engaging in financial misreporting, they do not fully eliminate earnings management. In particular, clawbacks appear to cause managers to reduce expenses that may create long-term benefits. Clawback provisions, therefore, may have unintended consequences for certain types of firms. Thus, mandatory clawback adoption pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act may lead to the same unintended consequences for those firms.
One limitation of our analysis is that firm-initiated clawbacks became popular after 2006, and this short time horizon prevents us from performing certain tests to examine the subsequent underperformance of clawback adopters. Future research could revisit this issue by examining whether managers' risk-taking or investment behavior is affected by clawback initiation. Such evidence would help us better understand the long-term consequences of clawback provisions.
